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The Economics of Class Actions and Class Action Waivers 
 
 




(forthcoming, Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev.) 
 
 
Abstract: Class action litigation has generated a series of recent Supreme Court decisions 
imposing greater federal court supervision over the prosecution of collective injury 
claims.  This group of cases raises the question whether class action waivers should be 
permitted on policy grounds.  I examine the economics of class actions and waivers in 
this paper.  I distinguish between the standard one-on-one litigation environment and the 
class action environment.  In the standard environment, waivers between informed agents 
enhance society’s welfare. In the class action environment, in contrast, not all waivers are 
likely to enhance society’s welfare.
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Class action litigation has generated a series of Supreme Court decisions imposing 
greater federal court supervision over the prosecution of collective injury claims.  In AT& 
T v. Concepcion,1 the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California’s 
application of unconscionability doctrine as a bar to the enforcement of an agreement 
prohibiting class-wide arbitration.  In Wal-Mart v. Dukes,2 the Court rejected an effort to 
certify a discrimination class consisting of 1.5 million female employees of Wal-Mart 
because the evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of a company-wide 
discrimination policy.  In the most recent case, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant,3 the Court held that an arbitration agreement that effectively waived class 
action rights – by relegating all disputes to a one-on-one arbitration process – was not 
inconsistent with the enforcement of rights under the Sherman Act. 
 
These cases raise the question whether class action waivers should be permitted on policy 
grounds.  The answer to this depends on the conditions under which class actions are 
socially desirable in the first place, and whether waiver agreements would harm society 
by eliminating some class actions. 
 
With these questions in the forefront, this paper examines the economics of class actions 
and waivers of class actions.  Its focus is on the welfare economics of class litigation – 
that is, the conditions under which the class action device enhances (or reduces) society’s 
welfare.  It also examines the welfare consequences of class action waiver agreements, 
and of agreements to individually arbitrate claims.  As a general rule, the private and the 
social incentive to litigate diverge; plaintiffs may bring lawsuits under conditions in 
which litigation reduces society’s welfare.  The same is true of class actions.  
 
I distinguish between the standard one-on-one litigation environment and the class action 
environment.  In the standard environment, waivers between informed agents enhance 
society’s welfare (Hylton, 2000).  The reason is that litigation waivers occur when, and 
only when, the deterrence benefit from litigation – that is, the degree to which the threat 
of litigation reduces injury costs more than injury-avoidance costs – is less than the 
overall cost of litigation.   
 
In the class action environment, in contrast, not all waivers are likely to enhance society’s 
welfare.  Because of the special economic circumstances of the class action environment, 
waivers may be exchanged between informed agents even when they are not socially 
desirable.  The key features that distinguish class actions from standard one-on-one 
litigation are two: the existence of a class size threshold below which a class action 
becomes uneconomical (class viability threshold), and the existence of a common 
precaution or injury-avoidance action that applies uniformly to the entire class.  These 
features create opportunities for inefficient waiver agreements among informed agents. 
 
                                                 
1 563 U.S. 321 (2011).  
2 131 S. Ct. 795, 564 U.S. ___ (2011). 
3 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), 570 U.S. __ (2013) 
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In spite of the incentive divergence problem in class action waiver contracting – that is, 
that the private and the social incentive to waive the right to class litigation may diverge – 
I conclude that a general prohibition on the enforcement of class action waivers may not 
be socially desirable.  In a potentially large set of cases, class action waivers among 
informed agents are socially desirable, just as in the standard one-on-one litigation 
scenario.  Indeed, within this set of cases, waiver agreements optimize the class action 
mechanism, by generating the greatest level of deterrence for every dollar invested in 
litigation. 
 
The key variable in distinguishing the effects of class action waivers is the class viability 
threshold.  If the efficient class size is so large that it is unlikely that a potential class 
action defendant can secure the number of waivers necessary to push the class size below 
the viability threshold, then waivers are likely to be efficient.  If, on the other hand, the 
potential defendant has a reasonable chance of securing enough waivers to push the class 
size below viability, then inefficient waivers may be observed.  In order to optimally 
regulate class action waivers, courts should identify the circumstances in which such 
agreements are likely to reduce society’s welfare, and circumscribe enforcement only in 
those circumstances.  A general prohibition on enforcement of class action waivers would 
be far too blunt for this task. 
 
In the antitrust context, the case for regulating class action waivers is perhaps stronger 
than in any other setting.  The conditions that generate inefficient waiver agreements, the 
economic need to have a class of sufficient size and the presence of a common injurious 
action, are clearly present in price-fixing cases.  However, even here the case for a 
blanket refusal to enforce waiver agreements is not compelling.  Even though attorneys’ 
fees are shifted under the antitrust laws, expert fees are not, and thus there is a danger that 
waivers may push the victim class size below the viability threshold.4  But given the 
presence of public enforcement, it is not clear that this would substantially reduce 
incentives to comply with the law.  The strength of the case for nonenforcement is also a 
function of the ability of victims to coordinate and the preclusive effect of the waiver 
contract. 
 
In any event, the primary goal of this paper is to set out a framework for evaluating the 
welfare effects of class actions and of class action waivers.  The greater part of this paper 
is an effort to classify types of class actions that are more or less likely to be conducive to 
inefficient waiver agreements.5  I conclude by applying the model to several topics in the 
literature on class actions. 
 
I. Illustration 
                                                 
4 One might argue on first impression that this danger should be slight, in light of the fee-shifting 
provisions of the federal antitrust laws.  However, the fee-shifting provisions do not allow prevailing 
plaintiffs to shift the full costs of experts to defendants, see In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 
667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 2012). 
5 Inefficient waivers of litigation are explored in Hylton (2000) and Guttel and Leshem (2013).  Potentially 
inefficient waivers of class litigation are explored in Lavie (2013).  This paper, in contrast, incorporates 
class waivers within a welfare analysis of litigation and of waiver agreements, and identifies conditions 




The model developed here is quite simple in comparison to most models of the 
economics of litigation.  Still, an even simpler example can be used to convey its core 
lesson.  Suppose a potential victim considers signing, before any dispute arises, an 
agreement to waive his right to sue a potential injurer – for example, it could be a skier 
considering whether to sign a contract waiving tort liability against a ski resort.  The 
individual will consider the benefits and costs to himself if he signs the contract, and the 
potential injurer will consider the benefit he gets from securing one waiver.  If the parties 
are informed, the waiver contract enhances the parties’ joint welfare. 
 
The welfare implications of waiver in the class action setting are a bit more complicated.  
Suppose there are 200 potential victims, each of whom may suffer an injury of $1, and 
the cost of proving liability to the entire class, if the injuries occur, is $100.  This would 
be an economically viable class action – the total damage award, 200×$1= $200, exceeds 
the cost of litigation, $100.   The class viability threshold is 100.  If the injurer signs 
waiver agreements with 101 of the potential victims, the size of the victim class drops to 
99, which is short of the viability threshold.  As a result, the injurer evades the threat of a 
class action suit.  In effect, the 101st victim waives for all of the remaining 99 victim 
victims who have not signed waiver agreements.   
 
If the 101st victim to bargain with the injurer could bargain on behalf of the remaining 
100 victims (himself included), he would have the proper incentives to set a price for the 
waiver.  Since he does not bargain on behalf of the group, and is likely to consider only 
his own benefits and costs from signing the waiver, his private incentive to accept a 
waiver exceeds the social incentive to waive.  Consequently, class litigation waiver 
agreements may be signed even when they reduce the welfare of all parties collectively.  
No assumption of strategic bargaining is necessary for this inefficiency outcome.  The 
key is the divergence in the private and the social incentive to waive for the pivotal 
victim who sits at the class viability threshold.   
 
The inefficiency result seems even more likely when the potential injurer bargains 
strategically.  The strategic injurer knows that he faces a special opportunity when he 
bargains for a waiver with the pivotal victim (that is, the 101st victim he bargains with).  
Given the possibility of escaping the class action threat altogether, such an injurer will 
offer a premium for the individual waiver from the pivotal victim, because it will 
preclude litigation from all remaining victims. 
 
This example leaves out several features that should be considered, such as a delineation 
of the terms of an efficient waiver agreement in the individual and in the class litigation 
settings, and the scope for efficient class litigation waiver contracts.  The model below 
develops these features. 
 
II. Welfare Economics of Litigation 
 




In this part, I review some basic lessons from the literature on the welfare economics of 
litigation.6  The literature has focused on the standard one-on-one litigation model, in 
which one plaintiff sues one defendant and there are no common issues that would justify 
class litigation.  After reviewing the lessons in this setting, I will explore the welfare 
economics of class litigation. 
 
There are two agents, injurer and victim, both risk neutral.  The injurer can take care to 
avoid injuring the victim, and taking care is costly.  If the injurer takes care, there is still a 
risk that he will injure the victim.  If the injurer does not take care, the risk that he will 
injure the victim is higher than when he does take care. 
 
This description of the relationship between injury and precaution easily encompasses 
intentional injuries.  Consider, for example, fraud.  The injurer who commits fraud 
chooses between committing fraud, or forbearing from the commission and thereby 
forgoing the profit he could make from the fraud.  The cost of “taking care” is simply the 
cost of forbearance, which is the profit that could be made from committing the act of 
fraud. 
 
Since taking care is costly, the injurer will not do so unless the alternative, failing to take 
care, is even more costly.  The threat of litigation guarantees that a decision not to take 
care will be more costly to the injurer than a decision to take care.  Although the victim 
may not win his lawsuit against the injurer, the financial burden of litigation defense plus 
the expected cost of paying for the victim’s injury are sufficient to lead the injurer to 
view taking care as more economically prudent than not taking care. 
 
The following variables define basic components of the model: 
 
 p = probability of injury when injurer does not take care 
 q = probability of injury when injurer does take care 
 v = loss  
 x = cost of care 
 cd = injurer’s cost of litigation 
 cp = victim’s cost of litigation 
 
I will assume liability is strict.  If, instead of strict liability, I assumed that liability is 
based on negligence, none of the important results of this analysis would be altered. 
 
I assume, in addition, that taking care is socially desirable, which means that the social 
loss avoided by taking care exceeds the cost of taking care, (p – q)v > x, and that the 
lawsuit has a positive expected value, v > cp.
7  Given that the victim will sue and win in 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Shavell (1982); Hylton (1990). 
7 I use the term “positive expected value” to contrast with the term “negative expected value” lawsuit, 
which has been used in the literature on litigation (Bone, 2003).  In this case, there is no need to use 
“expected value” because the outcome of the lawsuit is not uncertain.  However, I use the term anyway to 
remain with terms familiar in the literature on the economics litigation.  The same terminological approach 
is adopted in Ulen (2011). 
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response to an injury, the cost the injurer bears when he takes care is the sum of the cost 
of taking care, the expected liability to the victim, and the expected cost of litigation 
defense: x + qcd + qv.  The cost the injurer bears when he does not take care is the sum of 
the expected liability and the expected cost of litigation defense: pv + pcd.  Since the 
social loss avoided through care exceeds the cost of care, and the expected litigation 
defense cost is greater when the injurer does not take care, the injurer will take care. 
 
Shavell (1982) shows that litigation is socially desirable when and only when the 
deterrence benefit from litigation exceeds the cost of litigation: (p – q)v – x > qcd + qcp.  
Since the private decision to sue is based entirely on whether the claim has a positive 
expected value, private and social incentives to litigate diverge. 
 
Why might the deterrence benefit be less than the expected cost of litigation?  Litigation 
could generate over-deterrence – where the cost of precaution is greater than the losses 
avoided.  Alternatively, the deterrence benefit may be positive yet so small, because 
precaution is unproductive, that it is swamped by litigation costs.  Precaution will be 
unproductive in settings where additional care by the injurer has a negligible impact on 
expected harms, which could be due to precaution’s ineffectiveness in changing the 
probability of harm or to the extremely low level of harm.  Consider, for example, a ski 
resort.  After a certain level of precaution is attained, additional precaution by the resort 
owner will have little impact on the probability that a skier will be injured – injury is an 




The victim may choose to waive his right to sue by selling it to the injurer.  If the victim 
sells his right to sue to the injurer, the injurer will no longer take care.  Thus, the victim 
can expect to suffer, after selling his right to the injurer, the harm associated with careless 
conduct by the injurer, pv.  However, selling the right enables the victim to forgo the 
expense of suing, qcp.  The victim also forgoes the compensation he would receive for 
any injuries that might have occurred when he possessed the right to sue, but that 
compensation merely offsets the injuries suffered.  It follows that the minimum price 
asked by the victim to waive his right to sue is equal to the expected harm less the 
avoided litigation cost, pv – qcp. 
 
For the injurer, purchasing the waiver allows him to avoid the cost of taking care, in 
addition to the cost of litigation and compensation.  Thus, the maximum price the injurer 
will offer for a litigation waiver is x + qv + qcd.     
 
The injurer and victim will enter into a litigation waiver agreement when the asking price 
of the victim is less than the offer price of the injurer,8 which is equivalent to the 
condition under which litigation is socially undesirable.  Thus, as shown in Hylton 
(2000), if transaction costs are low, the right to litigate will be waived when and only 
                                                 
8 This ignores strategic considerations might prevent the victim and injurer from entering into a waiver 
agreement even when the asking price is less than the offer price.  At this stage of the analysis I have no 
interest in complicating the basic model by incorporating strategic issues. 
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when litigation is socially undesirable.  Private and social incentives to litigate diverge 
only when transaction costs are so high that waiver agreements cannot be effected.  
 
Among informed agents, waiver agreements will be executed when the productivity of 
care is low, when the cost of taking care is high, and when the cost of litigation is high.  
Taking care may be socially desirable, but if litigation costs are sufficiently large, the net 
benefit to society from the care induced by the threat of litigation may be swamped by the 
cost of litigation.9 
 
Consider again the ski resort example.  Since there is little that the owner of a ski resort 
can do to substantially reduce the risk of injury to skiers, the deterrence benefit from 
litigation is likely to be considerably smaller than the joint cost of litigation.  One should 
expect skiers and resort owners to execute waiver agreements, which is what one often 
observes. 
 
III. Litigation and Waiver of Class Actions 
 
Class actions require some modifications of the basic model presented above.  The class 
action scenario often involves a lawsuit that has a positive expected value if brought by a 
large group seeking damages, but a negative expected value if brought by one individual.  
For example, suppose a financial institution skims off pennies from the accounts of 
thousands of customers.  The total damage claim might be sufficient to justify a lawsuit 
by the entire class of customers, but the injury to any one customer, only pennies, would 
be insufficient to justify a lawsuit. 
 
In the model immediately below I assume that the lawsuit has a negative expected value 
if brought by one individual.  In a later part, I consider positive-expected-value class 
actions. 
 
A. Litigation Cost Structure and Incentives to Sue 
 
The plaintiff (victim) alleges a common wrong to an entire class.  In addition to the 
common wrong, there may be some idiosyncratic, special way in which the defendant’s 
conduct injured each victim of the class.  The cost of litigation for any plaintiff consists, 
then, of proving liability based on the common wrong and particular features unique to 
his case.   
 
Given this, the litigation cost for plaintiff i (i = 1,.., N) is of the form cpi = Cp + wpi, where 
Cp is the cost of the common component of proof and wpi is the cost of the idiosyncratic 
component of proof in the plaintiff’s case.10  The cost of the class lawsuit, cpN, is the sum 
                                                 
9 Recall that this assumes that the victim’s threat to sue is credible because the lawsuit has a positive 
expected value.  If the victim’s threat to sue is not credible, the injurer will not offer to pay for a waiver 
agreement, and will not take care in the absence of a credible threat of a lawsuit.  This “no lawsuits” 
outcome is socially inefficient when the deterrence benefit from litigation is greater than its cost. 
10 Che and Spier (2008) have a similar model of the structure of class action litigation costs, though their 
model assumes the existence of only the common component. 
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of all of the idiosyncratic components and the common component: cpN = Cp + wp1 + wp2 
+…+ wpN.  The common component’s cost is greater than the injury to the victim, v < Cp.  
Since each victim has a negative expected value claim, no victim will have an incentive 
to bring suit.11 
 
The class action aggregates the injuries of the victims.  If the class size is sufficiently 
large Nv > cpN, so the class lawsuit will have a positive expected value.  In effect, the 
class action device spreads the cost of the common component among all victims, so that 
the cost of litigation to each victim is effectively cpN/N.  It follows that there is a class 
viability threshold N͂, such that v = cpN/N͂.  When the class size falls below the viability 
threshold level (N < N͂), no individual will have an incentive to bring suit. 
 
The defendant’s litigation cost in a class action has a structure parallel to that of the 
plaintiff class: cdN = Cd + wd1 + wd2 + …+ wpN.  The total financial burden of class 
litigation for the defendant is Nv + cdN.
12 
 
B. Precaution Technologies and Lawsuit Types 
 
An important feature of class action environment is that the care the injurer must take to 
avoid harming members of the class can have the same structure as just presented for the 
cost of litigation.  In other words, in some settings there is a common, or centralized, 
component of care.  Consider, for example, a fire escape in an apartment building.  The 
landlord’s decision to install an escape, or to maintain it, is a precaution that affects all or 
a substantial share of the tenants roughly equally.  As a general matter the cost of taking 
care can be described as consisting of a common component and an individualized or 
idiosyncratic component – that is, X + xi, where X is the common component of care and 
xi is the idiosyncratic part.  
 
This framework points to four litigation scenarios.  In the first, the common component 
of litigation proof (or litigation cost) is zero and the common component of care is also 
zero.  This is the standard one-on-one litigation scenario modeled in the literature as well 
as in the previous part.  In the second, the common component of litigation is zero 
(idiosyncratic proof of liability) and the idiosyncratic component of injurer care is zero 
(common care).  In this scenario, proof of negligence is straightforward and the same for 
each victim, because there is a common precaution technology, but there is an additional 
component of the lawsuit – for example, proof of victim care or proof of damages – that 
is costly to determine and varies substantially among victims.  An example that falls in 
                                                 
11 This assumes that the common cost component cannot be shared among several individual lawsuits.  If 
the common component can be shared in a manner that replicates the class action mechanism, then the 
existence of the common component will not preclude any claims.  As long as cost sharing is more 
expensive or difficult in the absence of the class action mechanism, the basic structure of this model 
remains useful for examining class actions. 
12 Since the payoff to the class from the lawsuit, Nv – cpN, is less than the total financial burden of litigation 
for the defendant, the contract zone for settlement is not empty.  Whether lawsuit settles depends on the 
extent of informational disparities and strategic bargaining incentives – for a survey, see Bone (2003). 
While the model implicitly assumes all cases litigate, it can be modified to take settlements into account by 
multiplying cdN and cpN the fraction of lawsuits that are litigated. 
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this category is a failure-to-warn lawsuit in which the negligence of the drug seller is 
absolutely clear, but the class of victims consists of some people who took reasonable 
care for their own safety and others who did not.13  In the third scenario, the idiosyncratic 
component of litigation cost is zero (common proof) and the common component of care 
is zero (idiosyncratic care).  Such a structure might be observed where the injurer must 
determine the level of care to each potential victim (idiosyncratic care), but there can be a 
common failure that prevents the injurer from meeting the optimal idiosyncratic care 
levels – for example, in the case where a firm adopts a policy that is harmful to its 
consumers or to its employees, but its implementation depends on the uncoordinated 
conduct of many low-level managers, as alleged by plaintiffs in Wal-Mart.14  In the 
fourth scenario, the idiosyncratic component of litigation is zero, as is the idiosyncratic 
component of care.  This is the scenario in which the injurer sets a common care level for 
all of the victims – for example, installing a fire escape for apartment tenants – and the 
proof of violation and of the amount of damages is the same for each plaintiff.  Price-
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               Table 1: Litigation Scenarios 
 
 
                                                 
13 Of course, even if the drug seller’s negligence is clear, the plaintiffs will still be expected to prove their 
case at trial, and this implies Cp is greater than zero.  But if the common question is one for which the 
evidence is overwhelming, the cost of proof should be minimal, and the burden may be shifted to the 
defendant on grounds, similar to res ipsa loquitur doctrine, that the circumstantial evidence of negligence is 
sufficient to submit the case to the jury. 
14 Under the plaintiff’s theory of Wal-Mart, the employer had adopted a common policy of discrimination 
(common action), but its implementation depended on the actions of thousands of midlevel store managers 
(idiosyncratic action).  The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s theory on the ground that there was 
insufficient evidence of a company-wide policy of discrimination.  
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Many lawsuits probably fall somewhere between the various cells of Table 1; that is, 
some combination of idiosyncratic and common care, and some combination of 
idiosyncratic and common proof of liability.  Moreover, it is easily possible for a lawsuit 
that involves a substantial common component of proof to also involve substantial 
idiosyncratic questions.  Still, consideration of the scenarios in Table 1 can generate 
insights that can be applied to the more realistic mixed scenarios. 
 
C. Waiver of Class Actions 
 
Here I consider incentives to waive the right to bring a class action.  The simplest way to 
proceed is to examine Scenario Three, the Wal-Mart type of class action, in which the 
common component of proof is responsible for the primary part of litigation costs and the 
care decision by the injurer is idiosyncratic. This type of class action is closest in 
structure to the one-on-one litigation scenario considered previously.  Also to simplify, I 
will assume that there are no strategic considerations that influence waiver negotiations.  
The injurer and the victim are assumed to consider only the joint costs and benefits of a 
waiver agreement, not external costs or benefits.  I will introduce additional complexity 
as the discussion proceeds. 
 
In the absence of the option to bring a class action lawsuit, the threat to sue would not be 
credible, because v < Cp.  Given the absence of a credible threat to sue, no injurer would 
have an incentive to take care, and for the same reason no injurer would have an 
incentive to purchase a waiver. 
 
When the class action device is available, and the class size is above the viability 
threshold, each victim has a credible threat to sue, because v > Cp/N.  Given the existence 
of a credible threat to sue, the injurer will have an incentive to take care and to purchase a 
waiver offered at a sufficiently low price.  A class action waiver will be purchased when 
the price demanded by a victim to waive his class right is less than the price offered by 
the injurer to purchase the right.  Since care is individually determined, the price 
demanded by the victim is pv – q(Cp/N).
15 
 
The price offered by the injurer depends on the precaution costs avoided and his 
perception of the litigation costs avoided by waiving a class action claim.  If the class size 
is above viability, the injurer avoids only a small portion of the class action defense cost 
by waiving one potential claim, which I will assume approximated by Cd/N.
16  Given the 
                                                 
15 I treat Cp/N as the effective cost of the class action suit for the plaintiff.  This assumes that the aggregate 
cost of the lawsuit is spread evenly among the plaintiffs.  If the cost is not spread evenly among the 
plaintiffs then the cost of the class action for each plaintiff will be some fraction of Cp, where the fraction 
could be greater or less than 1/N.  I assume an equal share rule applies in this analysis, but other sharing 
rules are possible of course.  Moreover, the sharing rule adopted has implications for the stability of the 
class action.  On allocation rules and stability in class actions, see Teitelbaum (2010), Che (1996). 
16 The change in the defendant’s common element cost resulting from one waiver is the marginal cost 
ΔCd/ΔN.  Use of average cost Cd/N as an approximation of the marginal cost is based on two assumptions: 
(a) the common element defense cost increases with the size of the class, which is plausible given that a 
defendant has a stronger incentive to invest in defense as the class size increases (Ulen, 2011), and (b) the 
marginal cost goes to zero as the class size increases.  
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assumption of idiosyncratic care, the cost the injurer avoids by getting a waiver from one 
victim is x + qv + qCd/N.  A class action right will therefore be waived when: 
 
  (p – q)v – x < q(Cp/N + Cd/N). 
 
It follows that when the class size is above viability, an agreement to waive the class 
action right will be socially beneficial when the deterrence benefit of class litigation is 
less than expected litigation costs for the marginal claim.  Like waivers in the ordinary 
litigation setting, class action waivers are driven by the cost of litigation and the 
productivity of precaution. 
 
D. Victim Heterogeneity 
 
I have assumed so far that all members of the class are the same in terms of the nature of 
their legal claims, the effect of precaution on their risks of injury, and their injuries.  If all 
victims are the same, then if waiver is efficient for one, it will be efficient for all; and if 
waiver is inefficient for one, it will be inefficient for all. 
 
But class members may be heterogeneous.  More precisely, the deterrence benefit from 
precaution may vary across potential victims.  The effect of precaution on the risk faced 
by a potential victim may vary across victims.  The cost of precaution may vary across 
victims.  These differences may lead to an outcome in which a waiver agreement is 
efficient only for a subset of the potential victims. 
 
Suppose the level of harm differs among class members, ranging from the smallest harm 
level, vN, to the greatest harm, v1.  A class action lawsuit will be economically viable 
when the sum of harms is greater than the cost of class litigation: v1 + …+ vN > Cp.  
Equivalently, class actions will be threatened credibly as long as the average harm within 
the class is greater than Cp/N.  The class viability threshold is the class size at which the 
sum of harms is equal to the cost of plaintiff class litigation, or, equivalently, the class 
size at which the average harm is equal to Cp/N.  For simplicity, I will continue to treat 
Cp/N as the individual victim’s cost of class suit. 
 
A waiver will be exchanged between the injurer and victim i when (p – q)vi – x < q(Cp/Ni 
+ Cd/Ni), where Ni represents the size of the subclass consisting of victim i and those 
whose harms are greater.17  Thus, victims who have suffered the greatest harm levels will 
                                                 
17 This assumes that both potential plaintiff and potential defendant know the value of vi, which may not be 
true in many settings.  Specifically, the potential defendant may not have sufficient information to 
determine vi, which may impede the formation of a mutually beneficial exchange between the two.  The 
potential defendant may use some proxy for potential plaintiffs who have similar characteristics within 
identifiable subclasses.  For example, an employer may suspect that all employees who work within a 
specific job classification are likely to have similar losses.  The employer may therefore offer the same 
waiver terms to employees within that subclass, even though their individual losses are likely to vary 
around the mean for the subclass.  Moreover, if the burden of avoidance x is large relative to the harm vi, 
variation in vi will not affect the contract terms much.  The fact that the potential defendant does not know 
vi is not an insuperable barrier to waiver contracts of the sort described here being formed.  For example, 
Lavie (2013) discusses strategies for securing waivers in which the potential nuisance source approaches 
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not be able to enter into mutually beneficial waiver contracts – because the price they 
demand exceeds the amount the injurer is willing to pay.  Only those victims with 
relatively small harms will enter into efficient waiver contracts. 
 
i. Efficient Class Action Waivers 
 
As long as the class size remains above viability, all efficient class action waivers will be 
executed.  The litigants who do not waive will retain their class action rights.  To see this, 
order all potential class members from lowest to highest harm, and then choose a cutoff 
vN* satisfying the condition (p – q)vN* – x = q(Cp/N
* + Cd/N
*).  The efficient class size, N*, 
is the number of class members with v > vN*.  Waivers will be executed for all of the 
potential victims for whom v < vN*.  At the efficient class size, the deterrence benefit from 
class litigation, on the margin, is equal to the cost of class litigation.  Because of this, the 
efficient class size is the number of class members that maximizes the net social benefits 
provided by class litigation.  See Figure 1. 
 
In short, assuming a class size above the efficient level initially, waivers will bring the 
class size down to the efficient level.18  The deterrence benefit of actual class litigation is 
not sufficiently large for some class members to justify the litigation cost, and for those 
individuals, it would be socially (and privately) efficient if they executed a class action 
waiver, thereby saving the litigation costs.  Put another way, the waiver setting described 
here is one where there is a subclass of potential victims within which the productivity of 
care is low in comparison to the expected costs of litigation.  For victims within the 
subclass, a waiver permits them to take their compensation for risk up front, in the form 
of the price received for the waiver agreement, rather than seek compensation later 
through the class action. 
 
One might find it a paradox that small prospective injuries are appropriate for waiver 
agreements, given that the class action device exists to enable small injuries to be 
aggregated and brought to court.  But the ultimate matter of interest is the relation 
                                                                                                                                                 
various subgroups of nearby residents, whose prospective losses are roughly similar, in an effort to prevent 
the formation of a future litigation class. 
18 This should be contrasted with the claim (see Gilles, 2005) that waivers will be adopted uniformly 
because they serve to shield corporations from lawsuits.  Of course, Gilles’s argument is based on the 
assumption that waivers will be executed through take-it-or-leave-it (adhesion) contracts that do not permit 
any bargaining.  Unsophisticated potential victims (for example, consumers) may sign such contracts 
without any sense of what they have done.  My analysis is different, of course, because I am considering 
the actions of sophisticated potential victims.  But even if a large number of potential victims are 
unsophisticated, the existence of a minority of sophisticated potential victims suggests that adhesion 
contracts will still leave room for the sophisticated parties to exit and seek other contracting parties.  Any 
degree of competition should generate diversity in the set of contracts offered to potential victims.  
Contractual diversity should lead to efforts to sort potential victims into classes within which waivers may 
or may not be efficient.  The waiver efficiency argument here is also inconsistent with the theory that 
waivers will target “stronger” prospective victims (Lavie, 2013).  Waivers should be observed within 
subclasses for which the deterrence benefit is small relative to the costs of litigation.  Conversely, waivers 
will not be observed within subclasses for which the deterrence benefit is large relative to the cost of 
litigation.  Stronger victims may sometimes be within the class for which the deterrence benefit exceeds the 
litigation cost, and if this is the case, waivers are unlikely to target such victims. 
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between deterrence benefit and expected litigation cost, not the injury amount.  I have 
used the injury amount as a simple way of allowing for variation in the deterrence 
benefit.  A more general approach would allow for variation in precaution’s effect on the 
risk of injury, in the cost of precaution, and in the cost of litigation.  Moreover, the result 
that optimality may require a subset of low-level prospective injuries to be waived 
indicates that it is incorrect as a general matter to suggest that an optimal litigation 
system would funnel all low-level injuries through the class action mechanism.  If the 
deterrence benefit is low relative to the cost of litigation, waiver is appropriate, even for 
those low-level injuries that could be taken to court only through class action device.  
Moreover, because of the option to waive, made possible by the threat of class action, the 
victims of low-level injuries receive superior compensation than they would have 
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         N* = efficient class size 
              N͂ = class viability threshold 
       
 
    Figure 1: Class Action Waivers, Efficient Case  

















ii. Inefficient Class Action Waivers 
 
The foregoing discussion assumes that the class viability threshold is less than the 
efficient class size.  Now suppose the viability threshold is greater than the efficient class 
size, as shown in Figure 2.  Inefficient waivers are now possible, even in the absence of 
strategic bargaining tactics.  Suppose the injurer is bargaining for a waiver with a victim 
at the class viability threshold.  Since the efficient class size is below the viability 
threshold, the injurer’s offer price for a waiver will exceed the asking price demanded by 
the victim.19  The victim will waive and the threat of class action collapses, since the 
remaining number of victims will be less than the class viability threshold. 
 
This result could be inefficient.  The loss to society from taking away the class action 
right from the victims below the efficient class size could be greater than the gain from 
waiving the right for the victims above the viability threshold.  For example, suppose the 
class viability threshold is 100, the initial class size is 101, and the efficient class size is 
99.  The social cost of destroying the tort rights for 99 victims may easily be greater than 
the social gain from waiving the tort rights of victims 100 and 101.  The key to the 
inefficiency is that a waiver by the victim at the viability threshold imposes external costs 
on all of the victims below the threshold.  A waiver by the victim at the viability 
threshold effectively waives the class action rights of the remaining victims. 
 
                                                 
19 Note that nothing in this argument requires the potential injurer to know that he is bargaining with a 
potential victim located at the viability threshold.  The fact that the waiver contract is efficient (because the 
bargaining takes place with victims located “above” the efficient class size) is sufficient to guarantee that 
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         N* = efficient class size 
              N͂ = class viability threshold 
    
 
   Figure 2: Class Action Waivers, Possibly Inefficient Case  
      












iii. Strategic Bargaining and Inefficiency 
 
The foregoing assumes that the parties bargaining over waivers consider only the joint 
costs and benefits associated with their contract, not the contract’s effects on other 
parties.  That is overly simplistic, though useful for identifying some of the basic 
implications of waiver agreements in the collective litigation setting. 
 
If the injurer bargains strategically, the scope for inefficient waivers expands.20  The 
reason is that if the injurer is aware of the class viability threshold, he will have an 
incentive to offer a premium to victims above the threshold in order to push the class size 
below the threshold – in effect, bidding for sufficient waivers to preempt class 
litigation.21  The premium will reflect the savings to the injurer from destroying the class 
action right for all of the potential victims at one time. 
 
To see the efficiency implications of strategic bargaining, suppose the initial class size is 
105, the efficient class size is 102, and the class viability threshold is 100.  In the “non-
strategic” bargaining case, waiver agreements generate an efficient outcome in which 
low-deterrence-value victims waive and high-deterrence-value victims retain their rights, 
which optimizes the class action mechanism.  For example, suppose the waiver price 
demanded by victims 103, 104, and 105 is $20, and the waiver price demanded by 
victims 1 through 102 is $50.  Assume the amount the injurer is willing to pay is $25 
each for victims 103, 104, and 105; and $30 each for victims 1 through 102.  In the non-
strategic case, the injurer will secure waivers from victims 103, 104, and 105, since his 
offer price exceeds the demand price of each.  The injurer will not be able to secure 
waivers from victims 1 through 102, because the demand price of each victim exceeds 
the injurer’s offer price.  The class size of 102 provides the greatest deterrent benefit for 
every dollar devoted to class litigation. 
 
If the injurer bargains strategically, knowing that the class viability threshold is 100, he 
will offer a premium to victims 100 through 105 in order to get them to sign waiver 
agreements.  The outcome would be one in which class litigation rights are effectively 
waived for all victims, reducing society’s wealth.  Since the injurer knows that 100 is the 
viability threshold, the value of waivers from victims 100 through 105 is greater than the 
amount that he would pay if he considered only the benefits of each deal, which is only 
3×$20 + 3×$30 = $150.  Taking the benefit of crossing the viability threshold into 
account, the value of waivers from 100 through 105 is 3×$25 + 102×$30 = $3135.  Thus, 
the injurer is willing to pay as much as $3135, while victims 100 through 105 demand 
                                                 
20 In the homogeneous victims case studied earlier, strategic bargaining could occur too.  However, recall 
that in that setting, waivers will be efficient for all or efficient for none.  Strategic considerations would 
arise only if there are informational asymmetries that could generate inefficient waivers for all of the 
potential victims. 
21 The incentive identified here has been explored, in different forms, in previous articles.  Guttel and 
Leshem (2013) study property buyouts that serve the roughly same effect as litigation waivers in the 
nuisance context.  Che and Spier (2008) examine divide-and-conquer strategies that a defendant can use, 
after the dispute arises, in litigation against a class of victims.  Arlen (2010) identifies a similar inefficiency 
in contracting for medical care.  More general applications are discussed in Neeman (1999), Rasmusen, 
Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991).  
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collectively only 3×$30 + 3×$50 = $240 to waive their class litigation rights.  If the 
injurer were to attempt to purchase each waiver at the demand price, he would have to 
pay a total of 102×$50 + 3×$20 = $5160 for all of the waivers, which is far in excess of 
the total he would have been willing to pay, $3135. 
   
I have assumed that the victim does not bargain strategically.  If, instead, the victim 
bargains strategically, then a victim located at or near the viability threshold could hold 
up the injurer for the entire value of the benefit the injurer would receive from 
preempting the class action.  The inefficiency result could still occur, but it would be less 
likely.  Return to the numerical example.  If victims 100 through 105 bargain strategically 
– for their own interests and not as representatives of the entire group of victims – they 
could demand just a little less than $3135 (the total benefit to the injurer) to sell their 
waivers collectively.  The injurer might be willing to meet the price, but even then the 
trade would reduce social welfare. 
 
In any event, it seems reasonable to focus on the case in which only the injurer bargains 
strategically because the injurer is likely to be aware of the presence of a large pool of 
potential victims and the fact that it may be able to evade a class action through the use of 
waiver agreements.  The case in which the victim bargains strategically is less plausible.  
One victim within a large pool of victims is unlikely to have any sense of how many 
waivers the injurer has secured already before he bargains with the injurer.  And as the 
pool size expands, the likelihood of any particular victim being pivotal, in the sense of 
being located at the viability threshold, shrinks to zero (Neeman, 1999).  With a low 
probability of being pivotal, no rational victim would have an incentive to invest in 
determining whether he is at the viability threshold. 
 
Including a substantial idiosyncratic component in the cost of litigation would not change 
this argument.  Whatever the magnitude of the idiosyncratic issues, the class viability 
threshold has to be satisfied and a waiver signed by a victim located at the class viability 
threshold preempts class litigation.  The distribution of the idiosyncratic component 
merely influences the potential pool of victims willing to initiate class litigation without 
changing the bargaining dynamics.22 
 
iv. Reconciling Strategic and Non-Strategic Bargaining Cases 
 
                                                 
22 Where there is a significant idiosyncratic component, the threat of class litigation by the jth victim is 
credible only if vj > Cp/N + wpj, provided that the idiosyncratic proof component is observable.  If the 
idiosyncratic proof component is not observable, then the claim is credible once the victim group size 
passes the viability threshold.  If the victim group is below the viability threshold, no victim will have a 
credible claim.  In the intermediate case where the idiosyncratic component is not observable, vj > Cp/N, 
and vj < Cp/N + wpj, there may be a danger that class action lawyers will launch lawsuits that leave the 
victim class, or large parts of it, with zero or negative returns.  For example, suppose there are three 
potential victims, each likely to suffer a loss of $10.  The cost of the common component is $20.  The cost 
of idiosyncratic proof is $0 for the first one, and $20 each for the remaining two.  Suppose, too, that the 
cost of idiosyncratic component is unobservable ex ante.  Since $10 > $20/3, the class threat is credible.  
However, the total cost of litigation would be $40, while the total compensation would be $30.  If a 
settlement required each party to bear its idiosyncratic cost in proving damages, the second and third 
victims would never seek compensation. 
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How should one reconcile the conclusions from the strategic and non-strategic bargaining 
cases?  The most plausible account is that the conclusions of the non-strategic analysis 
should apply where the injurer is unable profitably to push the class size down below the 
viability threshold.  This is more likely to be the case as the efficient class size increases, 
and as the price demanded to waive by the victims who are least inclined to waive 
increases.23 
  
Return to the numerical example of the preceding part, and now assume that the initial 
class size is 600 (instead of the previous assumption of 105) and that the efficient class 
size is 400.  Again, the class viability threshold is 100.  In order to purchase enough 
waivers to push the class size below the viability threshold, the injurer will have to pay 
200×$20 + 301×$50 = $19,050.  The benefit of doing so for the injurer is 200×$25 + 
400×$30 = $17,000.  Since the benefit of eliminating the class action threat is less than 
the cost of pushing the class size below the viability threshold, the injurer will not attempt 
to do so. 
 
When the non-strategic bargaining assumptions are appropriate, this analysis delivers the 
following conclusions.   In Scenario Three (common litigation cost, idiosyncratic care), if 
the efficient class size is greater than the class viability threshold, class action waivers 
will be efficient, and indeed, waivers will be observed only when they are efficient.  On 
the other hand, if the efficient class size is less than the class viability threshold, 
inefficient waivers may be observed.  
 
When strategic bargaining is plausible – that is in settings where the injurer knows the 
class viability threshold and can preempt class litigation by pushing the class size below 
the viability level – the case for inefficiency resulting from class waivers is considerably 
stronger.  If the efficient class size is substantially greater than the viability threshold, 
efficiency is still likely to result.  But when the efficient class size is near the viability 
threshold, and bargaining is strategic, inefficient waiver agreements may be observed 
whether the viability threshold is above or below the efficient class size. 
 
E. Class Action Waivers in Common Care Setting 
 
A central feature of many class actions is the existence of a common element in the cost 
of taking care (Scenario Four).  Take the case where the class of victims consists of 
customers of a financial institution that regularly skims off a small amount of money 
from their accounts through a method that is difficult to detect and to prove in litigation.  
The proof of fraud against the institution is the same for every member of the class of 
victims, with no idiosyncratic variation at all. 
 
Consider the social desirability of litigation in this setting.  If there is no threat of 
litigation, and the injurer (therefore) does not take care, the total social cost will equal the 
aggregate harm in the absence of injurer care, Npv.  If the class action threat exists, the 
                                                 
23 Let βH and βL be the offer prices for the two types of victim, and let αH and αL be their respective demand 
prices, where βL > αL and βH < αH.  The cost of getting just enough waivers to push the class below viability 
will exceed the benefit when N*(αH – βH) > (N – N
*)(βL – αL) + (N͂ – 1)αH.  See the appendix. 
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total social cost will equal the sum of aggregate harm and litigation costs, given injurer 
care, and the cost of common care: Nqv + q(cpN + cdN) + X.  Litigation is socially 
desirable when the deterrence benefit, N(p – q)v – X, is greater than the cost of litigation, 
q(cpN + cdN).  If only the common component of litigation proof matters, cpN = Cp and cdN 
= Cd.  Thus, on a per victim basis, litigation is socially desirable when (p – q)v – X/N > 
q(Cp/N + Cd/N). 
 
Suppose the class size is above the viability threshold.  A waiver by a victim would not 
change his likelihood of being injured, since the injurer would be induced to maintain 
care given the threat of class action from the remaining victims.  A waiver prevents the 
victim from receiving compensation after an injury and relieves the victim of his share of 
the litigation expense; thus, the minimum price the victim will set for a waiver is qv – 
qCp/N.  The injurer, by purchasing a waiver, does not avoid the burden of taking care for 
the entire class; he avoids only the cost of compensating the victim and the share of 
litigation defense costs attributable to the victim: qv + qCd/N.  Since the injurer’s offer 
price definitely exceeds the victim’s asking price, a waiver will be exchanged. 
 
Suppose class size is below the viability threshold.  The threat of a class action is zero, so 
the injurer does not take care.  The victim would willingly waive his right for any 
payment in this setting, because it is worthless.  The injurer would have no reason to 
purchase it, other than to avoid uncertainties over the location of the class viability 
threshold. 
 
The question of interest is what happens at the class viability threshold (N = N͂).  For the 
victim at the threshold – the pivotal victim – waiving his right to sue increases his 
likelihood of injury, so his asking price will reflect this change in prospects: pv – q(Cp/N͂).  
The injurer, by securing a waiver, avoids the cost of common care as well as the litigation 
costs and liability for the entire class: X + qN͂v + qCd.  A waiver will be mutually 
beneficial, as between the injurer and the pivotal victim, when pv – q(Cp/N͂) < X + qN͂v + 
qCd.  Recall that class litigation is socially desirable when (p – q)v – X/N > q(Cp/N + 
Cd/N), where N is the size of the entire pool of victims.  Given the potentially large 
differential between the injurer’s offer price and pivotal victim’s asking price, the class 
action is likely to be waived by all victims, through a process of one-by-one contracts, 
even when retention of the class litigation right would be socially desirable.24 
 
This inefficiency result assumes that the victim at the viability threshold knows that his 
decision is pivotal and bargains for a price that compensates him for the costs that he 
would suffer as a result of signing a waiver.  However, as the size of the class increases, 
the assumption that the victim knows that he is pivotal becomes less plausible (Neeman, 
1999).  If the victim sitting at the viability threshold is unaware of his position, the 
inefficiency result is probably more likely to be observed. 
 
                                                 
24 Sequential property buyouts that operate in effect as waivers are explored in Guttel and Leshem (2013).  
Lavie (2013) discusses pre-dispute waivers that target prospective victims who are likely to sue or to 
receive high damages, leaving only victims who are less likely to sue or with low damages as potential 
litigants.  The sequential stripping of rights (after harm has occurred) is explored in Che and Spier (2008). 
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The incentive divergence problem could be avoided if the litigation rights of the class 
were transferred to a third party, who would then negotiate, in the manner of a union 
bargaining agent, over the terms of a class litigation waiver.  A single owner would 
internalize all of the losses to infra-pivotal victims when negotiating over a class action 
waiver at the class viability threshold.  A variation on the single-owner solution is 
coordinated bargaining among the potential victims.  If the victims can communicate 
with each other over the terms of the waiver, they would act as a single entity in setting a 
price for the entire bundle of waivers. 
 
IV. Positive-Expected-Value Class Actions 
 
The model examined previously assumes each victim’s loss is less than the cost of the 
common component of litigation proof.  However, the incentive problems explored there 
remain even when the victim’s loss is greater than the common litigation cost component.  
The reason is that the common litigation cost component gives victims an incentive to 
free ride on the litigation efforts of the first plaintiff. 
 
When v > Cp, the first victim to sue would enjoy a positive payoff from his lawsuit.  
However, the second victim to sue would enjoy a greater payoff because he would avoid 
the common litigation cost component – he receives the payoff v rather than v - Cp.  If we 
imagine two victims, with a choice of two pure strategies, “Sue Immediately” and 
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               Table 2: Payoffs from Litigation, v > Cp 
 
 
The final cell of the payoff table shows both victims receiving zero because they fail to 
bring suit (for example, the decision to wait puts them beyond the statute of limitations).  
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Under this payoff structure, the two off-diagonal outcomes (one chooses “Sue 
Immediately” and the other chooses “Wait”) are Nash equilibria in pure strategies. 
 
The two off-diagonal outcomes raise interpretive difficulties because they require one 
victim to sue immediately while the other one waits, and the victim who waits does better 
than the one who sues immediately.  If either victim could commit to waiting, he could 
guarantee himself a higher payoff than the one who sues.  A more intuitively appealing 
result can be found by solving for the mixed strategy equilibrium.  Think of the pool of 
victims as composed of some who are likely to sue immediately (quick-suit victims) and 
others who are likely to wait (slow-suit victims).  The decisions of victims will be 
determined by their lawyers, so the financial return from being in either category will be 
the primary determinant of the proportions of each to the whole.  So that the long-run 
payoff from being in either category is the same, the expected value of suing 
immediately, given the proportion of quick-suit victims in the population, must be equal 
to the expected value of waiting.25  Thus if a* is the long-run equilibrium proportion of 
quick-suit victims, the equilibrium value equates the expected value of waiting, av, with 
the payoff from suing immediately, v – Cp, which implies a
* = (v – Cp)/v.  Thus, in the 
absence of the class action device, a portion of the pool of victims, (1 – a*)2, will fail to 
bring suit because of the strategic incentives created by the common litigation cost 
component. 
 
The free rider problem results in an equilibrium in which a substantial percentage of 
victims fail to assert their legal rights, even though they have injury claims that exceed 
the cost of the common component of litigation.  The existence of a common component 
of proof provides an incentive to victims to wait and let some other victim be the first to 
prove the common component, in the hope of sauntering into court later to collect 
damages at much lower expense.  This incentive to free ride distorts litigation even when 
there are substantial idiosyncratic issues in the litigation.  Many of the victims who wait 
may reduce the value of or effectively forfeit their legal rights.26  Given that some victims 
fail to assert their claims, the injurer may not be forced to pay in full for the losses caused 
by his conduct.  If the shortfall in damages is large enough, the injurer will not have an 
incentive to take socially desirable care. 
 
                                                 
25 If the payoffs were not the same, all lawyers would either sue immediately, or all lawyers would wait.  
But if all plaintiff-side lawyers waited, the payoff to suing immediately would be greater than that for 
waiting. Similarly, if all plaintiff-side lawyers sued immediately, a lawyer could gain by waiting. 
26 Admittedly, this is an exaggerated view.  A rational victim will know that if he waits too long, he may 
forfeit his right, and therefore will not wait too long.  Moreover, the lawyer representing the first victim to 
sue may not be willing to share his research with later lawyers.  In addition, federal courts do not permit 
litigants who simply wait, to reduce their costs, to take advantage of offensive issue preclusion, see 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).  All of this suggests that the strategy of waiting (free 
riding), in order to reduce litigation expenses, is both more risky than suggested in the stylized analysis in 
the text and unlikely to be adopted without a serious examination of the risks.  Still, the strategy of waiting 
is likely to have a positive payoff, given the high likelihood that some valuable information will be gleaned 
by watching the experience of the first lawyers to sue.  The optimal waiting time may be difficult to 
calculate, and is likely to involve some risk of degrading the value of the right to sue.  This should be 
sufficient to support the model’s depiction of incentives in the class litigation game. 
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Here, the justification for the class action is not that it makes the assertion of legal claims 
economical, but that it avoids the outcome in which the free rider incentive among 
victims generates an equilibrium in which injurers adopt socially inadequate care.27  The 
mere existence of a substantial common component of litigation proof justifies resort to 
the class action device. 
  
Does the free rider problem have implications for the welfare consequences of class 
action waivers?  The answer is yes; inefficient waivers can occur in the positive-
expected-value setting, just as in the negative-expected value setting.  Suppose that 
among the pool of victims, a critical percentage must be inclined to sue immediately 
(rather than free ride) in order to provide the injurer with an incentive to take care. In 
other words, if the percentage of quick-suit victims falls below the hypothesized critical 
level, the injurer stops taking care.  If all victims waive their class action rights, and 
retain only the right to sue individually, then the resulting equilibrium percentage of 
quick-suit victims could fall below the hypothesized critical level.  Thus, a prohibition on 
waivers could enhance welfare by precluding an outcome in which the injurer rationally 




The main lesson of this framework is that the scope for inefficient waiver agreements, 
among informed agents, is considerably broader in the class action setting than in the 
standard one-on-one litigation scenario.  Inefficient waivers of class action rights are a 
plausible and indeed probable occurrence.  However, waivers can also enhance the 
efficiency of the litigation system.  In particular, when the efficient class size is so large 
that the defendant is unlikely to be able to secure enough waivers to preempt class 
litigation (by pushing the class size below viability), waivers will tend to maximize the 
deterrence benefit per dollar invested in litigation. 
 
Although my focus has been on class action waivers, this framework has broader 
applications to the literature on class actions, including the waiver of statutory litigation 
rights, waiver through arbitration agreements, and the scope of class litigation. 
 
A. Factors Driving Waivers 
 
This model shows that the factors driving class litigation waivers are the same as those 
driving waivers of ordinary litigation: low productivity of precaution, high cost of taking 
care, and high expected litigation costs.  Two features appear to distinguish class actions 
from ordinary litigation.  First, the class action appears to magnify the expected cost of 
litigation – that is, it makes litigation more costly and more frequent.  Second, the 
                                                 
27 This “free riding” theory offered here should be distinguished from an alternative theory supporting the 
use of class actions in the positive-expected-value setting presented by Spier and Rosenberg (2011).  In the 
Spier-Rosenberg account, individual plaintiffs have weak incentives to invest in the prosecution of the case 
in comparison to defendants.  If plaintiffs invest too little, they will lose at trial, and their losses will reduce 
the deterrent effect of the law. 
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incentives that generate class claims can also generate an expansion of claiming into 
areas in which the deterrence value of litigation is minimal. 
 
Because the class action device permits claims to be aggregated into much larger 
damages than ordinarily observed in litigation, litigation costs rise along with the size of 
the claims (Ulen, 2011).  Large claims induce parties to invest more into litigation.28  A 
plaintiff who thinks he can increase his expected judgment by $1000 will invest an 
additional $900 into his case in order to do so. 
 
The prospect of large awards generates a high likelihood of settlement, which spurs still 
more litigation and drives up expected litigation costs.  Firms are likely to settle because 
the size of the claim pushes them into a range of risks in which even large firms are risk-
averse.29  For example, suppose the damage claim for the class is $10 billion dollars and 
there is a one percent chance of an erroneous judgment for the plaintiff.  Under these 
conditions, risk-neutral defendants, will offer settlements on the order of $100 million, 
and risk-averse defendants will offer considerably more.   
 
The high likelihood of settlement, in turn, generates incentives for plaintiffs to assert 
novel and sometimes dubious claims.  Many claims of false advertising appear to be 
based on this incentive structure.30  In addition, plaintiffs have incentives to inflate the 
size of the class by including fraudulent victims (Brickman, 2007). 
 
The high likelihood of settlement, coupled with the relatively unregulated nature of 
settlements, generates incentives for collusive deals, further encouraging litigation and 
driving up litigation costs. Observed settlements have often entailed small benefits for the 
victim class – such as vouchers to purchase more of the defendant’s products – coupled 
with large payouts for lawyers.  The settlements are consistent with an incentive on the 
part of both injurer’s and plaintiffs’ lawyers to extinguish class claims in exchange for a 
side payment to the lawyers – “sweetheart settlements” (Koniak and Cohen, 1996; Hay 
and Rosenberg, 2000).31  For the same reason plaintiffs’ lawyers seek settlements that set 
aside large sums for third parties, such as special interest groups, in a process known as 
the cy pres settlement.32 
 
Sweetheart and cy pres settlements in class litigation imply that the deterrence benefit 
from litigation is likely to be less than its cost.  The reason is straightforward: if 
plaintiffs’ lawyers sue in part to transfer wealth, then the deterrence goal presumably 
                                                 
28 If the probability of a judgment for either party is a function of expenditures, large claims will induce 
additional spending.  The additional spending might, if the probability of a verdict for either party is 
dependent on litigation expenditures, bias the trial results in favor the party that spends the most, which will 
be the defendant if a class is not certified, see Spier and Rosenberg (2011). 
29 Judge Posner famously rejected a class certification bid on this basis in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 
51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
30 See, e.g., Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., expressing 
skeptical view of consumer deception claim). 
31 In contrast the “sweetheart settlements” view, Miller and Singer (1997) suggest that many forms of 
nonpecuniary settlement may be efficient. 
32 On such settlements, Yospe (2009); Redish, Julian, and Zyontz (2009). 
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takes a lesser priority among the factors motivating litigation.33  In addition, expected 
litigation costs are likely to be driven up as interest groups press plaintiffs’ lawyers to file 
suits that can be settled in order to provide payouts to the very interest groups that urge 
class action litigation. 
 
These factors, individually or combined, work to make class litigation waiver agreements 
efficient in probably more settings than suggested by the formal model of this paper.  
When the deterrence value sinks sufficiently low relative to the costs of litigation, 
competitive pressure will drive firms to seek waivers.  Sophisticated buyers or sellers 
who choose to waive their class litigation rights do so because the benefits they receive in 
exchange, in the form of a reduced price or in the availability of the good or service, are 
more valuable to them than the litigation right. 
 
B. Arbitration of Claims 
 
The contract between the injurer and the victim may require one-on-one arbitration of a 
claim rather than a waiver of the right to sue.  Does the presence of an arbitration clause, 
instead of a waiver clause, substantially alter the foregoing analysis? 
 
The economics of pre-dispute arbitration contracts are not substantially different from the 
economics of waiver agreements (Hylton, 2000).  For both types of agreement, the social 
desirability condition is the same.  The agreement benefits the contracting parties, and 
society as well unless there are externalities, if the deterrence benefits forgone are less 
than the litigation costs avoided. 
 
In the case of a waiver, it is straightforward to see how the social desirability criterion 
operates.  A waiver agreement discards the threat of litigation, and for that reason dilutes 
the deterrent threat that had been provided by litigation.  On the other hand, the waiver 
saves litigation costs.  Where the forgone deterrence benefits are small, and the litigation 
costs avoided are large, waivers enhance society’s welfare. 
 
Arbitration requires a slightly different calculus.  An agreement to commit future disputes 
to an arbitration forum may or may not reduce deterrence.  If the arbitration forum has 
superior accuracy properties than the typical court, committing to arbitration may 
enhance deterrence.  The reason is that a more accurate forum will punish the guilty and 
exonerate the innocent with higher likelihood.  Such a system creates a wider gap 
between the payoffs for legal compliance and legal noncompliance, which enhances 
incentives to comply with the law.  This is likely to be observed when the arbitration 
forum has greater expertise than does the typical court in resolving a particular type of 
dispute.  For example, an arbitration forum consisting of medical experts might provide a 
more accurate assessment of malpractice claims than would the typical jury. 
 
                                                 
33 More generally, the deterrence value of class litigation declines because of agency costs, see Macey and 
Miller (1991).  The model presented in this paper could be modified to incorporate agency costs, in order to 
show that agency costs reduce the deterrence benefit from class litigation.  
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A decision to commit a dispute to arbitration may or may not reduce dispute-resolution 
costs.  An arbitration forum consisting of experts who are paid at market rates to decide 
disputes may be more costly than a court consisting of ordinary jurors. 
 
Given these considerations, an arbitration contract might be efficient even when litigation 
costs are higher in the arbitration forum than in the typical court.   The reason is that the 
enhanced deterrence benefits from arbitration may offset the higher litigation costs.  
Conversely, an arbitration contract might be efficient even when the deterrence benefits 
are lower under arbitration – say, because the arbitration forum is less expert than the 
court – because the litigation costs are substantially lower in the arbitration forum than in 
court. 
 
In the main class litigation setting (Scenarios Three and Four), where a claim would be 
unprofitable to one victim because of the expensive common component of litigation 
cost, a pre-dispute agreement committing the victim to bring an individual claim in 
arbitration could be equivalent to a waiver.  However, the ultimate conclusion depends on 
the details of the contract.  If the injurer agrees to a special fee allocation rule, such as the 
pro-plaintiff fee shifting (including expert fees), a commitment to individualized 
arbitration would not be equivalent to a waiver; the victim could bring his claim and shift 
the common litigation cost component to the injurer.34  If the injurer does not agree to a 
special fee allocation rule, then an agreement to bring only individual claims in 
arbitration could be equivalent to a waiver.35 
 
In the end, concluding that an agreement to arbitrate on an individual basis is equivalent 
to a waiver merely returns us to the analysis of the preceding parts.  The fact that such an 
agreement might operate as a waiver leaves open the question whether the waiver is 
efficient.  In the Scenario Three setting where the precaution decision is idiosyncratic and 
the class viability threshold is considerably less than the efficient class size, arbitration 
agreements that operate in effect as waivers can be efficient.  In the scenario in which the 
precaution cost is centralized for the entire class of victims, efficient waiver contracts 
seem unlikely as a general matter.  These considerations can be applied to special cases, 
such as antitrust. 
 
C. Waiver of Antitrust Rights 
 
Should potential antitrust plaintiffs be permitted to waive their rights under the antitrust 
laws?  In this framework, this question boils down to examining which of the litigation 
scenarios examined above best describes antitrust. 
 
                                                 
34 For example, the arbitration contract in Concepcion permitted plaintiffs to shift attorney’s fees and expert 
fees for non-frivolous claims to AT&T.  See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).  
In addition, if the arbitration contract permits lawyers to share the cost of the common component of 
litigation, the individualized arbitration agreement need not preclude claims. 
35 But this depends entirely on the ability of lawyers to share costs within a portfolio of cases.  A lawyer 
might have an incentive to pay for an expensive expert if he can use the same expert’s report in many 




Start with the structure of litigation costs.  Is antitrust a setting where there is a common 
proof element for all plaintiffs, or one where litigation proof is primarily idiosyncratic?  
In the typical price-fixing scenario, antitrust is clearly a setting where there is a common 
proof element for all victims.  The consumer-victims of a price-fixing scheme form a 
class, often with economic losses that are relatively small in comparison to the cost of 
proving an antitrust violation (e.g., the costs of investigation and procuring evidence).  
Proof that the defendant engaged in price-fixing typically settles the liability question for 
all members of the class of consumers. 
 
However, the common-proof structure is an accurate description of only one category of 
antitrust claims – those involving price-fixing or market allocation schemes that directly 
harm consumers.  Monopolization claims, in contrast, are typically brought by a firm on 
the theory that it has been excluded from the market by a dominant rival.  For example, a 
plaintiff firm may sue because the defendant refused to deal with it.  The basis for the 
lawsuit is a theory that the exclusionary act imposes an injury on consumers by limiting 
competition and thereby causing an increase in prices, but the evidence of consumer harm 
is often ambiguous.  These cases are better viewed as falling within the standard one-on-
one litigation scenario (Scenario One), in which waivers of litigation rights among 
sophisticated parties generally enhance society’s welfare. 
 
It follows that a rule barring enforcement of waivers of litigation rights in antitrust would 
be too broad to be justified on social welfare grounds.36  The framework here does not 
provide a justification for refusing to enforce waivers of all antitrust claims, especially 
monopolization claims.  However, the case for refusing to enforce waivers of price-fixing 
claims is more complicated. 
 
Price-fixing litigation falls within the Scenario Three and Scenario Four settings, where 
litigation waivers might be inefficient.  The Scenario Three setting is where the 
forbearance decision is idiosyncratic; Scenario Four where there is a centralized 
forbearance decision taken for the class of victims as a whole.  The classic price-fixing 
case falls in Scenario Four: a firm makes one centralized forbearance decision, whether to 
set its price at the cartel level, and this decision imposes an injury on all members of the 
class.  This is the setting in which the case for prohibiting waivers of class litigation 
rights is strongest. 
 
However, a prohibition on the enforcement of waivers governing price-fixing claims may 
not be socially desirable, even though private and social incentives to waive diverge.  
Invalidating waivers may or may not enhance social welfare, depending on the 
circumstances.  If the waiver contract allows for arbitration, with shifting of all costs 
(including expert costs), then it is unlikely to thwart private antitrust enforcement.37  In 
                                                 
36 The rule was adopted by the Second Circuit in In Re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 667 F.3d 
204 (2012), and reversed in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. __ (2013). 
37 Relatedly, Noll (2012) proposes that class action waivers not be enforced where they would result in 
“substantial wrongdoing”.  Where public enforcement remains vigorous, it seems unlikely that class action 
waivers will meet the substantial wrongdoing requirement.  In general, however, the definition of 
“substantial wrongdoing” and the welfare effects of Noll proposal are unclear. 
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addition, with the option of public enforcement of antitrust, the existence of a class 
viability threshold is of doubtful importance.  Potential victims of price-fixing could all 
waive their rights, and yet the pressure to comply with the law would remain if the threat 
of public enforcement remains significant. 
 
A refusal to enforce a waiver agreement governing price-fixing claims might be justified 
under a set of narrower conditions: where there is no effective public enforcement 
backstop, where the potential victims are too numerous to coordinate in bargaining, and 
where the arbitration agreement (which operates in effect as a waiver) does not permit 
claimants to shift all litigation costs to the defendant.  For example, in the context of 
goods marketed to ordinary consumers, the typical consumer may be too uninformed and 
have too little influence over the actions of government enforcement agencies to present a 
serious threat of initiating a public enforcement action against an antitrust violator; and 
consumers as a group are likely to be too numerous to coordinate in bargaining. Under 
these conditions, the danger that waiver agreements will reduce society’s welfare is 
significant.38 
 
D. Scope of Class Actions 
 
Real cases are mostly a mixture of the stylized scenarios introduced in Table 1.  The 
plaintiff’s case often will involve a mixture of common and idiosyncratic components of 
proof.  The injurer’s precaution will also involve common and idiosyncratic components.  
The most difficult issue in many litigated cases is determining whether the evidence 
supports the claim that a case consisting of numerous victims deserves to be certified as a 
class action. 
 
Under the framework of this paper, a substantial common component of proof should be 
sufficient to meet the minimal requirement for class action status, even if there are 
idiosyncratic issues as well. The mere fact that there are idiosyncratic issues should not 
deprive a victim group of class action status as long as there is a substantial common 
component of proof.39 
 
An argument to the contrary is that when the idiosyncratic issues are substantial, there is 
little to guarantee that the incentives of class attorneys and victims are aligned.  Attorneys 
may file suit, settle, and leave most of the class with a zero or negative return.40  But this 
points to a need for reforms that help to align incentives rather than decertification (Hay 
                                                 
38 The dire predictions of Gilles (2005) are based on this scenario.  However, there are other scenarios 
which waiver contracts will be offered to sophisticated contracting parties.  A regulatory policy governing 
the enforceability of class action waiver contracts should take into account the likely sophistication of the 
parties and the potential for welfare-reducing contracts.   
39 One argument to the contrary is that when the idiosyncratic issues are substantial, there is little guarantee 
that the incentives of class attorneys and victims are aligned.  Attorneys may file suit, settle, and leave most 
of the class with a zero or negative return.  But this seems to point to a need for reforms that help to align 
incentives rather than decertification (see generally Hay and Rosenberg, 2000).  In the absence of any 
plausible reforms decertification is a second-best approach to regulating attorney incentives when the 
idiosyncratic issues are substantial. 
40 See the example in note 20. 
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and Rosenberg, 2000).  In the absence of plausible reforms decertification is a second-
best approach to regulating attorney incentives when the idiosyncratic issues are 
substantial. 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) requires proposed class actions to satisfy 
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.  
Rule 23(b)(3), governing actions for damages, holds that class action status is 
inappropriate if the common issues do not predominate over idiosyncratic issues.  These 
are not easy standards to apply, and the 23(b)(3) requirement appears to go against the 
simple economic message that the mere existence of a substantial common component of 
proof can justify class action status.   
 
The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, a 23(a) “commonality” case, claimed that female 
employees were denied promotions and raises in accordance with a general firm policy of 
discrimination.  However, the policy’s implementation depended on the actions of 
thousands of low-level managers.  The Supreme Court rejected the bid to certify a class 
of 1.5 million victims. 
 
Under the plaintiffs’ theory of the case, Wal-Mart falls under Scenario Three (common 
litigation proof component, idiosyncratic care), in which the common component of 
litigation proof predominates over idiosyncratic issues.  To prove their theory, the 
plaintiffs needed data on firm-wide promotion practices, which is expensive to collect 
and analyze, and this constituted the common component of litigation proof indicated by 
the plaintiffs’ theory.  In addition, each of the 1.5 million victims, to the extent they had 
suffered discrimination, had suffered it in a unique way.  Thus, each victim’s claim 
involved some idiosyncratic proof of discrimination. 
 
In rejecting the plaintiff’s bid for class certification, the Court held, in effect, that there 
was only weak support for the theory that Wal-Mart was a Scenario Three case, because 
the evidence of a centralized discriminatory policy was speculative.  In terms of this 
paper’s framework, Wal-Mart, as seen by the Court, involved substantial idiosyncratic 
proof questions and a trivial or nonexistent question of common proof.  The balance 
between common and idiosyncratic parts is less important than the fact that the common 
component did not appear to be substantial at all. 
 
Antitrust cases brought by purchasers seeking compensation for overcharges under Rule 
23(b)(3) typically fall in the Scenario Three (common litigation cost) or Scenario Four 
(common litigation cost and common or centralized care) categories in which class 
actions may be necessary for injury claims to be asserted.  A class of antitrust victims 
generally will consist of injury claims that have a common component of proof; 
specifically, the antitrust violation.  Still, the Supreme Court rejected certification in 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,41 an antitrust case.  Class certification had been granted on 
only one of four antitrust theories that the plaintiff had initially asserted.  However, the 
plaintiff’s evidence did not show that the consumers within the proposed class had 
                                                 
41 133 S. Ct. 24 (2013). 
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suffered any harm under the theory on which certification had been based.  The Court 
held that idiosyncratic claims dominated common claims.   
 
Although the Court’s view is at first glance inconsistent with the framework of this paper, 
it can be defended on the ground that to the extent harm had been demonstrated, it 
resulted from a combination of the four antitrust theories, and therefore any recovery for 
the class would have to be understood as recovery under all of the antitrust theories, 
including those rejected as unsuitable for class certification.  However, the core flaw in 
the plaintiff’s case was not that the consumer class’s harms did not involve a common 
component of litigation proof, but the lack of sufficient evidence of consumer harm under 
the theory on which certification had been granted.  The imposition of a requirement for 
such evidence is consistent with treating 23(b)(3) as a proof standard, requiring the case 
to have a common proof element that is likely to be satisfied by the plaintiff. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
The welfare economics of waivers in the class action setting are more complicated than in 
the standard, one-on-one litigation scenario.  In the standard litigation scenario, waivers 
between informed agents enhance society’s welfare, because they are exchanged when 
and only when the deterrence value of litigation is less than its cost.  In the class litigation 
scenario, in contrast, waivers between informed agents might be exchanged even though 
they reduce society’s wealth.  The simple reason is that there is a pivotal prospective 
victim, sitting at the class viability threshold, who effectively waives the rights of the 
entire class.  But the possibility of an inefficient outcome is not enough by itself to justify 
a blanket non-enforcement policy with respect to waivers of class litigation rights.  A 
regulatory policy against enforcing waiver agreements, to have any prospect of raising 
social welfare, would have to target the settings in which waivers are likely to be 
inefficient.  And even in the scenarios in which waivers are potentially inefficient there 
are special circumstances which counsel caution toward proposals to prohibit such 
agreements.  The welfare consequences of waivers depend, inevitably, on the terms of the 





Appendix: Preemption of Class Actions through Waiver Agreements 
 
This appendix provides a more formal version of the argument in the text.  Suppose there 
are two types of victim with damage levels vH and vL, representing high damages and low 
damages respectively.  Let αH and αL be the demand prices for waivers of the two types 
of victim, which means αH = pvH – qCp/N and αH = pvL – qCp/N.  Let βH and βL be the 
offer prices for waivers from injurers to the two types of victim, which means βH = x + 
qvH + qCd/N and βL = x + qvL + qCd/N.  In addition, let βL > αL and βH < αH, which means 
that waivers are efficient for the low-damage victims and inefficient for the high-damage 
victims.  The initial class size is N0, the efficient class size is N
*, and the viability 
threshold is N͂. 
 
A. Non-Strategic (No Preemption) Bargaining 
 
The injurer is assumed here to negotiate waiver agreements, one-on-one, without 
attempting to preempt the class.  Assume, first, that N* > N͂.  Retention of the class action 
right by all members of the class is socially desirable if 
 
      (N0 – N
*)(αL – βL) + N
*(αH – βH) > 0, 
 
where (N0 – N
*) is the number of potential victims for whom the deterrence benefit is less 
than the expected cost of class litigation.  Since the first term is negative, waiver 
contracts enhance social welfare by canceling the class litigation right for the victims in 
the group N0 – N
*.  If N* < N͂, the parties in the group N0 – (N͂ +1) will efficiently waive 
their litigation rights, and the class is effectively preempted.  Waiver (or preemption) of 
the entire class is efficient if 
 
           (N0 – N͂ – 1)(βL – αL) > [(N͂ –1) – (N
*+1)](αL – βL) + N
*(αH – βH), 
 
which means that the social gain from waiving the class litigation right for the first set of 
victims, N0 – N͂ – 1, exceeds the social loss from preempting the class litigation rights of 
the second set of victims.  This condition may or may not hold. 
 
B. Strategic Bargaining and Preemption of Class Litigation 
 
Now the injurer bids preemptively to cancel the class litigation right.  Assuming N* > N͂, 
the amount that the injurer is willing to bid for a sufficient number of waivers to 
eliminate the class action threat is 
 
Injurer preemptive bid = (N0 – N
*)αL + (N
* – N͂ + 1)αH. 
 
Victims in the group (N0 – N
*) are those for whom waiver is efficient.  In order to 
completely eliminate the threat of a class action the injurer must also obtain waivers from 
the remaining victims up to and including the victim located at the class viability 
threshold.  Thus, if the class size is 600, the efficient class size is 300, and the class 
viability threshold is 100, the injurer will offer a relatively low bid for the 300 low-
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damage victims, a relatively high bid for the victims between (and including) victims 
number 300 and 100. 
 
The benefit the injurer receives from securing enough waivers to eliminate the class 
action threat is 
 




The injurer will offer a preemptive bid whenever the cost of the preemptive bid is less 
than the benefit to the injurer.  This condition is satisfied when N*(αH – βH) < (N0 – N
*)(βL 
– αL) + (N͂ – 1)αH, or equivalently, when  
 
αH – βH < (N0/N
*–1)(βL – αL) + ((N͂ –1)/N
*)αH. 
 
Thus, preemption of class litigation through waiver agreements is more likely as the 
difference between the waiver demand prices of high-damage and low-damage victims 
decreases, and as the efficient class size declines relative to the total and to the viability 
threshold.  Conversely, preemption of class litigation becomes less likely as the waiver 
demand price spread increases and as the efficient class size increases relative to the 
initial class size and the viability threshold.  Preemption of class litigation is efficient if  
      (N0 – N
*)(βL –  αL) + N
*(βH – αH) > 0, 
and since this may not be satisfied when it is profitable for the injurer to preempt the 
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